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Abstract
The damage caused by phishing does not only apply to
monetary property alone. The fragile bonds of trust that
organizations build with their constituents are shattered
in the process. As people loss faith in the reliability of
electronic communication methods, companies loss their
customer base. In the case disasters, people can spend
billions in preparation, to analyze weaknesses and
improve recovery time, only to have thrust shattered by
phishing attacks. This in turn causes a significant loss in
money, resources and time.
In this study we review the main characteristics of
phishing attacks and their impact to society. Based on
current trends, we predict an increase in frequency and
precision of these attacks and suggest best practices for
both user and business education such that the impact is
minimized.

1. Introduction
Phishing is defined as sending e-mails claiming to be
from legitimate business and trying to entice the
recipients into giving up confidential information. A
successful phishing attack can have disastrous
consequences for the victims leading to financial losses
and identity theft. While relatively low in success rate
until now, phishing attempts have recently increased in
frequency as well as quality, requiring a fresh look at
their impact, at detection methods and education efforts.
In this paper we address several new issues related to
phishing. First, we investigate the concept of contextaware attacks where the phishing message is formed
based on context information related to the victim (such
as coming from businesses most likely associated to the
victim). We discuss several approaches to acquiring such
information and also see whether an increase in the
success rate is resulting.
Second, we investigate the effect phishing has on
legitimate businesses and the communication with their
customers. Faced with over 150,000 unique attacks in
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2005 alone [1], banking and other financial institutions
have increasingly taken active steps in educating their
customers on fraudulent activities. Unfortunately, in this
process, two disturbing trends are noted. First, legitimate
institutions themselves do not follow ‘good
communication’ rules further increasing the general
population confusion. Second, increased awareness of
phishing leads to an increased false positive
identification, where legitimate messages are discarded,
thus hindering communication.
Our third research direction is the impact of phishing
attacks when associated to disaster reaction and recovery.
In these instances, given the highly emotional nature of
the events as well as the new phishing issues discussed
above, it is expected that the attack success rate will
significantly increase. This in turn will result in decreased
trust and support for legitimate agencies and also add to
confusion.
Trust, support and reliable communication are
essential factors in reducing the effect disasters have on
the population. Our study indicates that phishing attacks
could negatively affect these factors. As such, we suggest
that organizations involved in reaction and recovery from
disasters and emergencies consider including phishing
education in the population awareness programs, at the
same time, following ‘good communication’ rules in their
interaction with the public.

2. Context-Aware Phishing Attacks1
Originally phishing attacks worked using the same
principal that spam works on. Phishing is using social
engineering and combining it with spam e-mails, sending
the byproduct to unsuspecting victims, known as phish.
The e-mails are disguised as, or “spoofed” to appear as
they originated from legitimate corporations.
The
phishers goal is to “fish” for confidential information that
1
Note, other sources, including [2] refer to Context-Aware attacks as
“Spear-Phishing.” In this paper, we will use the term “Context-Aware”
attack, set forth by [3].

the phishes have access too. This sensitive data can
include bank account numbers, usernames and passwords,
As many other
and social security numbers [4].
technologies, both good and bad, phishing has and will
evolve as time passes and phishing techniques are
perfected.
With this in mind, we have seen studies that suggest
that Context-Aware Phishing Attacks are the next phase
in the refinement of phishing techniques [5] [6]. A
context-aware attack consist of the phisher gaining
knowledge of what sites and services the phish use and
customizing an attack that appears to be from the target’s
service. [2] [3] Currently phishing attacks are carried out
by sending tens of millions of e-mails out over the
internet. 99% of the recipients might not even use the
service targeted by the attack, but that one percent of the
population that use the service have a high likelihood of
taking the bait [4]. If that number of victims can be
increased, while decreasing the total number of spammed
accounts, then the chances of more people falling victim
will increase. In short, decrease the total audience while
increasing the total number of phish [3].
This creates a problem for vendors of antivirus, antispam and even firewall companies, because they gear
their products to defend users from large-scale attacks.
Meanwhile, smaller more focused attacks can slip through
the cracks [7]. Using various techniques from browser
recon to identity linking, phishers can target their victims
in order to maximize their catch. For standard users and
security experts, the problem comes when trying to
defend from this kind of an attack. With a regular
phishing attack many users, even those uneducated in
phishing can identify the e-mail as fraudulent and delete
it. A context-aware attack is harder to decipher than a
regular attack, and can cause even more damage if a
paranoid victim decides to delete legitimate e-mail [8].

2.1 Better Bait.
At first, one might wonder how a phisher can obtain
personal information about potential phish. Two general
ways that phishers can gather knowledge on their phish is
by either data mining any of the social networks and
databases available to the public, or retrieving the
information from an end-user’s own internet browser.
Social networks and public databases prove to be
simple and efficient resources that are easily exploitable.
There are a significant number of people who post private
information in social networks. The social networks,
listed in [5] provide phishers with desirable and reliable
information about their targets. By using a script to mine
information from anyone of these resources, one could
easily construct a database of target’s information [5].

Beyond the use of social networks, one’s browser may
also be a gold mine to phishers looking to create contextaware attacks. Web browsers including, Microsoft
Internet Explorer (IE) and Mozilla Firefox, both store
cache from website that the end-user has visited. This
cache may contain, but is not limited to internet pages,
media, form responses and login information [9]. As
specified by both [9] and [3], the data from the browser
can be easily collected from unsuspecting users that store
their passwords and other login data using the
autocomplete feature. The vulnerability of using the
autocomplete feature of these web-browsers is illustrated
in [10] with a script that attempts to grab sensitive
information from the autocomplete feature. Of the
respondents that executed the script created by [10], 2.7%
of them were discovered to store their names within their
web-browser. Approximately the same percentage of
people had both their home and e-mail addresses retrieved
by the script. The script also returned 0.7% of
respondent’s credit card numbers and passwords. These
numbers might seem small, but on a large scale of a
million users, the numbers approximate to 27,000 names
and 7,000 credit card numbers that phishers can acquire.
Phishers can also use the data stored in the end-user’s
browser history learn of the targets internet habits and
develop a customized context-aware attack based on the
acquired data on the phish [11].

2.2 Increased Catch
Two specific studies have been made analyzing the
vulnerability of institutions [6] [5]. In the former study,
the administrator at West Point created a phishing e-mail
that he sent out to a select 512 cadets of the 4,200 student
campus. This proof-of-concept experiment sent students
a spoofed e-mail claiming to be from a nonexistent
Colonel and asked them to confirm their grade reports
online. The e-mail took advantage of the mentality at
West Point where cadets must perform an order from a
Colonel in spite of what their orders [6]. Over 80% of the
cadets responded to the phishing e-mail. Of the results it
is important to note that timing, as well as knowledge of
the West Point mentality played a role in the success of
the phishing e-mail. Timing was key in this experiment
because of the subject of the phishing message. The
message was sent at the end of the semester, when cadets
would be most concerned about their grades. As seen in
this experiment, they flooded the system, neglecting the
obvious warnings, embedded in the e-mail, that the e-mail
was fraudulent [6]. The paper also makes note that
unbeknownst to the deployment team, the school sent
seniors a legitimate e-mail three days before the
deployment team sent out there e-mail. Therefore, there is

a high probability that the seniors associated the
legitimate message with the fake one sent out later.
This trend was also noted in a phishing identification
test conducted in [12]. As stated in that paper, the
question on the administered test that received the least
correct responses was one that claimed to be from the
University Registrar. This question was incorrectly
identified by 64% of the participants. At the time of the
administration of the test, the University revealed that a
large amount of their student data was inadvertently
disclosed publicly, making the students more susceptible
to identity theft. As with the aforementioned West Point
experiment [6], the students in [12] associated the
example presented to them, with what occurred on their
campus, and believed it to be legitimate. Furthermore, this
phishing identification test was administered a second
time after the paper was published, and four months after
the university sent out a legitimate version of the e-mail.
The results were nearly identical, 67% of the students
identified the message incorrectly.
The second aforementioned experiment, [5] took the
concept of knowing something about the target in
advance and used social networks commonly used to
students at Indiana University to harvest information for
their own personal phish database. This controlled
context-aware phishing attack proved to be as successful
as [6]. The study monitored both a random phishing
attack from a source unbeknownst (the control case) to
the test subject and a spoofed e-mail claiming to be from
a source that the subject knows (context-aware attack). In
the end, the control case had a success rate of 16% while
the context-aware attack had a return rate of 72% [6]. An
important conclusion to note about this experiment is that
social and context-aware attacks appear to cause people
to overlook vital clues that may otherwise alarm them that
the e-mail they received is a phishing attack.

3. Effect on Legitimate Businesses
The most obvious harm caused to legitimate
businesses and organizations is the monetary damage that
1.

Do not request personal information directly through
hyperlinks [13]
2. Refrain from “click here” hyperlinks [13]
3. Do not get customers in the habit of responding to emails in methods phishers use. [13]
4. When possible personalize e-mails [13] [14]
5. Keep URL’s simple [13]
6. Make sure to use proper spelling and grammar in emails[13] [14]
7. Do not request delivery receipts [14]
8. Use meaningful subjects [14]
9. include e-mail disclaimers [14]
10. use bcc over cc when doing mailings [14]
11. Do not use third party sites or link redirection [9] [13]
Figure 1. List of recommended e-mail practices that
businesses can follow to avoid looking like phishers.

phishing causes. In 2003 alone, it was estimated that
phishing caused approximately $1.2 billion in direct
financial loses to US Banks and credit card companies
[15]. Indirect losses to businesses are much higher
because they include customer service expenses, account
replacement costs, and higher expenses from online
services due to a decrease in use caused by lack of trust in
data security [15]. This lack of trust towards online
services provided by the organizations is understandable.
After all, the standard phishing attack is delivered to
victims through e-mail.

3.1. Promoting Bad Business Practice
A stereotypical phishing e-mail contains some sort of
statement from the phisher, claiming to be a legitimate
business asking the user to update or confirm their
information in the system. Currently, millions, if not
billions of e-mails use this guise. Therefore, a regular
person would most likely consider an e-mail matching the
description above to be a phishing attack. The problem
arises when businesses do not follow good e-mail
practices and actually request the information through an
e-mail or provide links for the customers to click on.
These e-mails may confuse customers and cause them to
either delete a legitimate e-mail or get into a bad habit
that will make users more likely to respond to a phishing
attack. Many corporations and banks alike still have not
changed their policies to be less confusing for their
customers. At the time of publication of [16], American
Express had developed a reputation for sending confusing
e-mails to customers.
We have also personally received a similar e-mail in
nature from a reputable bank was similar in nature and
marked as having a 99% probability of being spam. In
reality, after searching through the headers and examining
the message, we determined that the e-mail was actually
legitimate.
In addition, during the process of
authenticating the e-mail, we found a section on the
bank’s website that said they will not send customers any
e-mails requesting personal information. This section of
there website has since been removed.
In a different example, Expedia sent their customers’
advertisements for special offers, but have the offers
channel through a third party site that looks like a
phishing attack. To make matters more interesting, the
company sent the special offers through third party sites
neglecting to check if the customer has disabled the send
me special offer feature in their user preferences [17].
Bad business e-mail practices like the ones above risk
companies losing customers. Figure 1 lists several
important e-mail practices that businesses should follow
to help reduce the confusion that phishing e-mails have
created
for
their
user-base.
Although
these

recommendations may seem to be common sense advice,
as seen above, many corporations and organizations do
not follow these simple guidelines.

3.2. Training and False Identification
Educating users in dangers of phishing is a necessity
that needs to be taken with caution. While a strong
education of the dangers of phishing is important to
computer user, [8] shows that as users receive more
education, they become more likely to think that an email is a phishing attack, instead of a legitimate message
from a company that they do business with. Furthermore,
confusing legitimate e-mails that are sent out by some
companies, as listed in section 3.1, contribute to the
added confusion that users face when reading their email. Rather than risking irreparable financial damage,
educated customers are more likely to delete these emails. This results in a decreased use of online services
with the companies as discussed in [15]. Thus, electronic
means of communication, for companies to consumers is
hindered as more and more customers choose to ignore email messages that were legitimately sent to people’s
inbox.

4. Impact on Disaster Reaction and Recovery
Disasters have the ability to bring out the best and
worst in people. One only has to think back to the recent
events of both the 2004 Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina.
Each disaster caused an unimaginable amount of damage
as well as large number of civilian causalities. These
tragedies brought about a large amount of philanthropic
donations from the public to help the victims.
Unfortunately, with the generous flow of money towards
charity, both phishers and scam artists alike have decided
to divert some of the funds into their own pockets.
In the events of the Tsunami, one phisher was arrested
with a database containing over 800,000 e-mail address
that he had been phishing with e-mails disguised as if
they were from Paypal(www.paypal.com) [19]. Figure 2
exemplifies a phishing e-mail sent out to take advantage
of the misfortunes of the Tsunami victims.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, images of the chaos
seen in New Orleans as people looted the stores will
forever be ingrained in the minds of this generation. Still,
the cyber crimes that took place after the hurricane
dissipated are far more damaging. Authorities shut down
several phishing sites in the aftermath of Katrina that
involved phishing scams. These websites contain
legitimate
sounding
names,
including
katrinadonations.com,
katrinarelief.com
and
katrinahelp.com [20] [21]. These sites in particular were

Figure 2. A Tsunami Phishing e-mail masked as it
has been sent from Paypal [18]
registered to a P.O Box owned by a “Demon Moon.” All
of them appear to be construed to steal the passwords of
sympathetic people who were trying to help out victims
through the use of legitimate sites.
In any disaster, a fast response is crucial. With, this in
mind public support is needed for a speedy recovery from
damage. Phishers that use disasters to their advantage are
basically creating a context aware attack. In the situation
with disasters, phishers know that people are more likely
to donate money to charity, and overlook obvious
warning signs that the attack might display. Although the
attack is not as fine-tuned as a context-aware attack
described in section 2, phishing attacks masked as charity
requests will continue to improve in quality as time
moves on.
Similar to the effects in section 3, phishing can and
will destroy the trust the public has in using the internet in
disasters. Phishing, which has already received a large
amount of media, due to the financial damage it causes,
has already discouraged internet banking. It can
significantly cut the relief aid that people were willing to
give the victims through legitimate websites that belong
to organizations like the Red Cross [21].

5. Conclusion
Trust, support and reliable communication are
essential factors in curving the damaging effects from
disasters. Phishing scams destroy all three of these
elements. By receiving a phishing e-mail that claims to be
a legitimate organization, such as the Red Cross, people
question the authenticity of the message. As described in
section 3, if people cannot validate the e-mail they
received, because of bad e-mail practices by the charity
organization, then they will most likely delete the e-mail
due to lack of trust. By deleting the e-mail support for the

disaster is lost, because fewer donations are received as
aid. Thus, unless a reliable means of communication is
established elsewhere the recovery from disaster will
become more drawn out than it should have been.
Charities, as well as businesses, need to practice good
e-mail habits when dealing with public trust. By
establishing good etiquette with e-mails as discussed in
section 3.1, organizations can build trust. To reinforce
this trust, organizations need to also keep in mind the
problems that phishing presents to disaster recovery. By
ignoring the problem trust can and will be destroyed, in
addition to a much more prolonged recovery time. As
phishing attacks continue to evolve with time, recovery
plans that factor phishing need to be updated as well in
order to not only stay ahead of the phishers, but also to
preserve trust.
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